Physiology at King's College, in the course of his investigations into the application of the principles of antiseptic surgery to the brain. In these animals, the lesions were made by cautery, and were accurately confined to the areas whose functions were to be investigated; and lack of secondary extension was verified microscopically after longer periods of survival.
Ferrier reported experiments on five monkeys. In the first, a lesion 1.0 cm in diameter, pre-and postcentral (for Ferrier's excitation maps included the postcentral gyrus), caused monoplegia of the opposite arm without other deficit. Tactile sensibility of the hand was 'most acute' (but was tested by 'the slightest touch with a heated point'). This animal survived two months before succumbing to the cold winter. The second exhibited monoplegia of the opposite leg and was kept for eight months, when the lesion and degeneration descending from it were defined postmortem. The third, hemiplegic, monkey was still alive seven months after the operation, and showed no loss of tactile sensibility (to the heated point?) 'as frequently found in clinical practice', and no other deficit. The fourth showed blindness, and no other deficit, after bilateral ablation of occipital lobes and angular gyri. After some months it avoided obstacles. It, too, died in the winter cold. In the fifth monkey, which was still alive, bilateral temporosphenoidal lesions caused deafness but no other deficit. Ferrier concluded that 'Professor Goltz's hypothesis is erroneous, and that such facts are explicable only on the theory [sic] of a distinct localization of faculties in definite cortical regions'.
In the afternoon, members of the Section were invited to visit the Laboratory at King's College, London to examine the dog which had made the journey with Goltz from Strassburg, and two of the monkeys of Ferrier and Yeo.
Goltz's dog (18816) had had five operations between November 1880 and May 1881. When its box was opened it reared up on its hindlimbs. It ran around actively, wagging its tail continuously. The hindlimbs slipped on a slippery floor. It avoided obstacles, but appeared to lack visual fixation. It did not withdraw from a candle held close to its face. (Goltz had mentioned in the morning that it had even licked the face of a spitting cat.) A gentleman lit a cigar and blew smoke in its face, from which it did not withdraw, but only turned its head when much smoke was blown. It was not deaf, for it moved its head when a whip was cracked, but did not crawl away. That the skin was everywhere sensitive was demonstrated by squeaking and struggling when an aesthesiometer specially constructed by Ewald reached a threshold pressure. Goltz concluded that no sensory function was lost and that there was no paralysis. The animal's general stupidity was evident in its failure to respond to threatening or friendly gestures and to escape from a fence lower than the height of the box from which it could always climb out. The dog would be killed with chloroform so that members could see for themselves the enormous lesion.
Ferrier (18816) then exhibited two of the monkeys he had described that morning. The first was the hemiplegic animal in which, after seven months, movements of the contralateral leg were 'greatly impaired' and the arm was 'quite powerless ... flexed at the elbow, the thumb bent on the palm, and the fingers semiflexed. Charcot was heard (by Sir Charles Ballance) to remark 'It is a patient!' The animal was stated to be in every other respect normal (but no examination of somaesthetic function was demonstrated). The second was the monkey with bilateral superior temporosphenoidal lesions of ten weeks' duration. It showed no sign of paralysis or blindness. 'While the two monkeys were on the floor together before the audience, Dr Ferrier snapped a percussion cap in their immediate proximity, whereupon the hemiplegic monkey started with the most lively signs of surprise, whereas the other exhibited not the slightest indication whatever of hearing. This experiment was repeated several times with the same result.'
Yeo (1881), who had performed the operations, said that his special interest had been in the surgical problems involved in operations on the brain, and that he had embarked on them 'with distinct misgivings as to the existence of local cortical centres, in Ferrier's sense'. He thought that the negative results in dogs could not argue against the positive results in monkeys, which 'seem to curtail in an absolute manner the very extensive generalizations Professor Goltz wishes to draw from his experiments'. Yeo thought that the field of vision of Goltz's dog was restricted or his sight deficient, because he suddenly stopped before an object, or bumped the right side of his head (Goltz had said the left side of his body). The dog seemed to know his friends, because he had learned in three or four days to recognize the person who fed him in London. If he did not react to Goltz's threats, this might have been simply because he had learned that they were never carried out. If his gait was unnatural, this was not from want of intellectual power but due to distinct loss of power over his hind legs. 'Besides expressing how much I have learned from my learned friend Professor Goltz, I candidly admit that, should the entire of the so-called motor centres prove to be destroyed in this case, he has succeeded in completely changing my views on the question of cerebral localization.' Yeo expected that much of this dog's cerebral cortex would be found intact. Having seen the monkeys' circumscribed lesions whose accuracy had been made possible only by the aseptic [sic] method, 'I feel sure that Professor Goltz will modify his opinion as to the 'utter folly' of the view that special parts of the brain are peculiarly associated with certain functional departments, and, though I am far from endorsing the edicts of Munk, or accepting, without reservation, the views of Ferrier, I venture to hope that our friend from Strassburg will no longer think that the observations which describe any persistent functional disturbance, as a result of a local lesion of the brain cortex, are einfachfalsch?
The dog and the hemiparetic monkey were then killed under chloroform. The brains were removed with the assistance of Professor Purser, Dr Gaskell and Mr Langley and were shown at the next meeting of the Section of Physiology. The frontal lobes of the dog were intact, and part of the so-called motor areas remained on the left. Much of the temporal lobes remained intact, together with strips of parasagittal and occipital cortex on both sides. In spite of the more extensive damage to the right hemisphere, Goltz insisted that there had been no asymmetrical deficiency during life, and no paralysis. The monkey showed a well circumscribed but very extensive lesion, post-as well as precentral. Drawings of both brains were published in the Transactions, which appeared before the end of the year.
The Council thought that, in attempting to come to a conclusion on the somewhat conflicting results, it would be very valuable to obtain exact knowledge of the amount of grey matter destroyed in each case. Having learned that 'the gentlemen to whom the animals belonged most cordially agreed to this arrangement', Foster proposed that the brains be entrusted to a Committee nominated by Council: Drs Gowers, Klein and Schafer and Mr J. N. Langley. 'The foregoing suggestions were unanimously carried.' Preliminary reports by Klein (1881) and Langley (1881) on the dog, and by Schafer (1881) on the monkey, were also included in the Transactions. Their full reports were published later (Langley, 1883; Klein, 1883; Schafer, 1883) .
Envoi
The afternoon at King's College had its sequel in November at Bow Street Magistrate's Court. Ferrier had to answer a summons applied for by three barristers for violation of the Vivisection Act [sic] of 1876. The Magistrate dismissed the summons. The Proceedings were reported verbatim in the British Medical Journal (mi, 2, 836-842) .
Langley had Sherrington's collaboration in his examination of the right hemisphere of the dog. Langley and Sherrington (1884a) demonstrated sections to the Physiological Society, and a full paper by Langley and Sherrington (18846) was published later in that year.
Goltz continued to make ever-wider ablations in dogs and published the results of complete removal of the forebrain (1892). The dog's behaviour was similar to that of the dogs of 1881. Serial sections of the brain had been cut in Edinger's laboratory at Frankfurt; these were given to Gordon Holmes who described and illustrated them in his paper on "The nervous system of the dog without a forebrain ' (1901) . Sherrington, who visited Goltz's laboratory in the winter of 1884-5, was also given a brain and spinal cord which he also described (1885). As time went on, Goltz (1888) convinced himself (always on dogs) that amputations of different lobes had different consequences, but he considered the assumption of small circumscribed centres more nonsensical than ever.
PRESENT PROBLEMS
The centenary meeting took place in Hertford College, Oxford on August 4 and 5, 1981. The participants are listed in the Appendix. It was organized in four sessions of three hours each at which the chairmen tried to encourage general discussion on such topics as: are there any principles of cortical organization common to all the sensory areas of the cortex? What is the significance of topographic and nontopographic maps? What functions are represented in cortex, especially motor cortex? Is there a basic structural and functional uniformity in the organization of the cortex? In the hope of providing a starting point and some common ground for the discussion, reprints of papers by some of the participants had been precirculated (Barlow, 1981; Iwamura et ai, 1981; MacKay, 1978; Phillips, 1981; Zeki, 1981) .
In contrast to the meeting one hundred years earlier there were no dramatic confrontations, nor was there any single topic that dominated the meeting. Instead the general mood might be described as that of a group who appreciated the fiendish complexity of the organ they were studying and of the tasks it performs, and were consequently wary of accepting generalizations that would probably appear simplistic in a few years' time. Much experimental material was briefly introduced and discussed, but it is probably fair to say that most enthusiasm and optimism was shown for the potentialities of modern anatomical methods. Though the detail that these methods reveal is at present almost totally incomprehensible, they do seem capable of providing information about the types of cells, their numbers, and their patterns of interconnection, upon which our future understanding of how the cortex really works must be based.
The discussions at the meeting were, to say the least, somewhat inconclusive, but during its course a number of suggestions were made that may possibly be welded together into a general theory of the cerebral cortex, and we shall expose ourselves to possible ridicule by attempting to do this in the final section of this paper. At this point it is worth mentioning these ideas so that the reader can see how they arose in the discussions. The first is the idea that there is a single basic operation performed in all parts of the cortex, and that this may be the detection of associations, or covariation, or 'suspicious coincidences', among the inputs to each particular small region of cortex. It can be shown that the performance of this task is much simplified if the nerve cells communicating with each other in the cortex adopt a uniform 'cortical language', or system of conventions. This in turn leads to an appreciation of the importance of the redistributive role of cortex, for it seems that the organized redistribution of information, perhaps according to nontopographic principles, may be what makes it possible for one small part of cortex to receive the inputs among which associations or coincidences of crucial importance to an animal's success or survival can be detected. Another set of ideas came from discussions about the changes in mapping that occur when sensory input is changed, and the possible role of the inputs to layer 1 as a 'state control' managing such changes. We shall return to these different strands of thought in our attempt to formulate a preliminary general model of the cortex, but first an account of the free ranging discussions will be given.
Lessons from Lesions
A hundred years ago, when Goltz and Ferrier were arguing about the cerebral localization of function, cortical cytoarchitectonics was in its infancy. Neither Campbell (1905 ), Brodmann (1905 , nor von Economo and Koskinas (1925) had charted the cortex, studies of the anatomical connections of the brain were virtually unknown, and microelectrode physiology was a thing of the future. The arguments were thus based on what appeared to the scientists of that time as the best evidence available, namely, whether lesions in particular parts of the cortex affected particular functions. In today's terms, the lesions were very crude, often spanning (as in Ferrier's studies) what we now consider to be separate cortical areas. Equally, the questions asked appear to us to be simplistic. Our predecessors asked whether vision, or general sensation, or motor function, was localized; and they did not probe in detail into the submodalities of vision or general sensibility or into different categories of movement or posture.
A hundred years on, today, there is a wealth of information on the cerebral cortex. Sophisticated anatomical and electrophysiological techniques have apparently resolved all doubts, if such there were, that different parts of the cortex are indeed specialized. No one would seriously question the proposition that the visual and somatosensory areas, or the auditory and motor areas, execute radically different functions. But paradoxically, in spite of the wealth of information on the cortex now available to us, some of the most suggestive evidence for functional localization still comes from the same kind of study that so impressed scientists of a century ago. Thus, the description by Zihl et al. (1983) , related at the meeting by Fries, of a patient with a bilateral symmetrical prestriate lesion demonstrated by CT scan, who was unable to detect motion although perfectly able to read, see forms, colours and depth, was perhaps one of the most convincing accounts in favour of functional localization. It was reminiscent of the recent work of Pearlman et al. (1979) who described a patient with a posterior cerebral lesion. This patient, like that of Mollon et al. (1980) , was massively impaired in his ability to discriminate colours, although his perception of depths and movements, as well as his reading ability, was unimpaired.
If animal experiments could reproduce these results derived from human patients, then much that seems ambiguous when electrophysiological and anatomical studies are compared with behavioural ones would be resolved. Unfortunately, such evidence is not easy to come by. Cowey reported (Collin and Cowey, 1980 ) that lesions in the motion area (V5) of the superior temporal sulcus in monkeys, an area in which directionally selective cells predominate (Zeki, 1974) , results in no observable defect. By contrast, lesions in visual cortex result in a fairly profound increase in threshold for disparity, though this may simply reflect damage to the foveal areas where acuity is high (Cowey and Porter, 1979) . Equally, large lesions of the striate cortex, known to have a preponderance of orientation selective cells Wiesel, 1962, 1977) , lead to only a slight rise in threshold for discriminating different orientations (Pasik and Pasik, 1980) . At first this seems to imply that we are not able to infer functions of an area from our physiological studies, perhaps because several different areas cooperate in a perceptive task and we are therefore naive in supposing that we can restrict our lesion to a single functional area and see a single functional defect. But this disappointing conclusion may result from preconceptions about function that lead to asking the wrong questions and performing the wrong tests. Thus Berkley and Sprague (1979) found only small deficits in grating acuity of striate-lesioned cats, and even orientation discrimination was only decreased by a factor of about 2. On the other hand vernier acuity was practically abolished, a result that fits well with the idea that the striate cortex is involved in tasks requiring high positional accuracy (Barlow, 1979 (Barlow, , 1981 . Clearly we must be a good deal more exigent in our definition of function, and this lesson was re-emphasized in the discussions on multiple maps {see below).
What Constitutes a Cortical Area?
It is not surprising to find that our definition of a cortical area is no longer quite as simple as the one conceived a hundred years ago, and at the meeting various problems were raised, but no agreement was reached. Zeki considered the best known example of an area, namely, area 17 of monkey cortex. Everything about it suggests that it is a single area. It has a uniform cytoarchitecture, a uniform distribution of ocular dominance columns and a uniform input from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). As well, it has a complete and topographic representation of the retina. Yet in other properties it is nonuniform and if these were emphasized it might be concluded that it is not a single area. Zeki reported that his results, as well as the earlier ones of Poggio et al. (1975) , show that the distribution of so-called 'colour coded' cells is not the same all over area 17. Instead, the frequency of such cells reaches about 40 per cent in the representation of the central 2 deg, and there is a rapid decline at increasing eccentricities, so that at an eccentricity of 20 deg no more than 2 per cent of cells are 'colour coded' (Zeki, 1983) . In this context, he noted that the percentage of 'colour coded' cells in the V4 complex has been compared misleadingly to the percentage of such cells in foveal VI (central 2 deg). The comparison is misleading because, unlike VI, only the central 20 to 30 deg of the retina is represented in the V4 complex and the receptive fields of the cells in the latter are about four times larger than in the former. Moreover, unlike VI, there is no strict topography in the V4 complex, with the consequence that in any single penetration, even a perpendicular one, receptive fields can cover the central 10 to 15 deg, or even more. It follows that to make an adequate comparison of the percentages of'colour coded' cells, equivalent eccentricities in the two areas must be sampled. Indeed, if foveal VI and the V4 complex were compared, it would be found that the percentage of 'colour coded' cells is more or less similar. However, if the proportion of such cells within the central 10 to 30 deg in VI and in the V4 complex were compared, a substantial difference would be evident (Zeki, 1982a, b) . This in fact raises the general problem that the distribution of any given category of cell is not necessarily uniform across the whole of an area. For example, the distribution of orientation selective cells varies with eccentricity in VI and the V4 complex, but in opposite directions (Zeki, 1982a) . Similarly the distribution of'colour-coded' cells is eccentricity dependent in VI and follows other, and unknown rules, in the V4 complex (Zeki, 1975 (Zeki, ,1983 . Hence the information obtained by studying any given small region of an area, such as VI, is not necessarily true for the whole area. Foveal VI, for example, is substantially different from more peripheral VI.
Although these differences may be nothing more than a result of the topographic projection of a nonuniform surface (the retina) on to a highly uniform one (the striate cortex), the fact remains that just such functional and anatomical differences have been used to distinguish other areas from each other. How should this difficulty, which mainly arises from improved anatomical and physiological techniques, be overcome? Crick suggested that while features across an area may not be uniform, the changes may be gradual rather than abrupt. Perhaps, then, abrupt changes should be sought as a means of defining a boundary. But it is essential to look for abrupt changes not in just one feature, but in several features simultaneously. If we concentrated on a single feature, we might well be tempted to consider the peripheral monocular and binocular parts of area 17 to constitute two areas! Mountcastle amplified this by saying that gradients, and even sudden changes, do occur within an area, but at the borders there are abrupt changes in all layers simultaneously, even when there are no corresponding abrupt changes in the afferents and efferents. One example is the sudden change in receptive field size and the heavy emphasis on binocularity from VI to V2 across the cytoarchitectonic boundary. Another is the sudden change in receptive field size and the heavy emphasis on directional selectivity on moving into V5 (Zeki 1974 (Zeki , 1981 . Both these changes affect all layers simultaneously.
Nor were the difficulties of defining an area restricted to visual cortex. Merzenich related how the input to the different areas of the auditory cortex in cat is in parallel, there being no 'primary' auditory cortex (Merzenich, 1981) . Al is subdivided into bands of excitatory-excitatory and excitatory-inhibitory interactions between input from the two ears. Tangential penetrations show discontinuous steps in best frequencies. Is Al therefore a functional area or, on the arguments applied to area 17, should each of the local substructural units be considered a distinct cortical area? According to von Economo the cytoarchitecture of Al is not at all uniform. Yet these excitatory-inhibitory and excitatory-excitatory bands might merely reflect the nonhomogeneity of the commissural connections of Al, which should still be considered a single area, especially since an abrupt change occurs in both the tuning curves of cell responses and in the cytoarchitecture at the border of A2.
The discussion could be summarized by saying that the old cytoarchitectonic boundaries do not necessarily mark the only changes in the cortex, but they are still very useful guides to important changes of function.
Are Maps Outmoded?
If there was no unanimity of views on what constitutes an area, this was at least in part a consequence of changing concepts about the representation of function within cortical areas. One change is that the old argument about motor cortex has spread to other cortical areas. This argument revolved around whether the motor area is made up of dense, quasi-insulated projections to the motoneurons of individual muscles, these being somehow accessible to the Will, or whether the projections are overlapping. In the latter event, the significant organization, as Hughlings Jackson originally maintained, would be in terms of 'sensorimotor processes representing movements', that is, frequently used combinations and sequences of muscular activation, subject to control by the 'highest level' of the brain. The first hypothesis has now been falsified: it is firmly established that the projections overlap widely, and that single corticospinal axons branch to supply motoneurons of more than one muscle (Phillips, 1981) . Recent work on monkeys reported by Lemon (1981a, b) supports the second hypothesis. He found that some neurons which sent their axons into the pyramidal tract discharged when the monkey was picking up seeds with its thumb and index fingers, but not when it grasped a ball with all five digits, although many muscles would have been common to both performances. Some neurons which discharged in relation to precisiongripping by thumb and index did so only when the wrist was in a particular orientation. The types of pattern selectivity discovered in cerebral cortex by Hubel and Wiesel point in the same general direction. Moving, orientated, lines and edges are frequently occurring combinations and sequences of activation of sensory afferents; they might be considered to be analogous to the most stereotyped and frequently used combinations and sequences of muscle activation required for a movement.
The demonstration by Mountcastle and his colleagues (Mountcastle, 1957; Powell and Mountcastle, 1959) of discrete groupings of cells in somatosensory cortex responding to particular sensory modalities introduced another new strand of thought. The participants at this meeting were thus searching for more sophisticated ideas about representation. They were not asking how the retina is projected onto the visual cortex, but how motion, form, or colour information may be organized there; not how the sensory surface may be mapped in the somatosensory cortex, but how different modalities of sensation are organized; not for yet more detailed mapping of connectivity between motor cortex and subcortical levels, but how the known connections are engaged in the combination and sequencing of excitation and inhibition of muscles in motor acts.
Iwamura (Iwamura et al., 1981) reported recording from the somatosensory cortex in the awake behaving monkey, and finding that the representation of the fingers was neither orderly nor uniform. Of interest was his finding that neurons which were suspected to have restricted receptive fields from recordings in the anaesthetized monkey turned out to respond optimally only when the animal grasped, for example, a horizontal bar and thus involved several joints simultaneously. By contrast, Merzenich's results, also on monkey (Merzenich et al., 1978 , indicated a continuous representation of the hand in layer IV of area 3b; the representation of the digits was continuous, not separated by that of other parts of the hand. His result indicated that the mapping in the somatosensory cortex was constant over long periods in any single animal, but that there were differences between animals. In addition, there are gaps in the skin surface representation within area 1 and area 3b, and the gaps within the two areas are themselves different.
Other examples of discontinuities were reported. Among these are the gaps in the map such that the receptive fields of contiguous cells in the motion area (V5) may represent noncontiguous retinal positions, there being often striking jumps from the receptive field of one cell to that of the next (Zeki, 1980a (Zeki, , 1981 . Zeki suggested that it may be misguided to consider such representations as 'disorderly' or 'chaotic' for they are such only in terms of a fixed anatomical structure, the retina, and it is only if it is insisted that the retina must be mapped on to such areas that the representation would appear chaotic. As Mountcastle reported, the receptive field of a cell in area 7 may include the entire visual field, perhaps sparing the area centralis, with marked specializations within the receptive field (Motter and Mountcastle, 1981; Yin and Mountcastle, 1977; Zeki, 1980a) . To think of these maps as maps of the retina continues a rigidity of thinking inherited from the past.
Perhaps a more powerful approach is to ask how function, rather than position, is mapped in the cortex. In this form the question may even be asked of areas which years of research have shown to have a precise representation of the body surface, as in V1. Daniel and Whitteridge (1961) reported that V1 has a distorted representation of the retina due to the disproportionately large representation of the fovea. One reason for maintaining the topology of the map is that eye movements may require geometric mapping. This may be occurring in the pontine nuclei (gaze centres) to which the region of the central representation in VI has little projection, but which receives a heavy projection from the representation of peripheral VI (Fries, 1981) .
Concepts of mapping and representation of visual space are largely derived from electrophysiological studies in which the receptive fields of single cells or groups of cells are plotted. Is this approach suitable when seeking to understand the higher functions of the cerebral cortex? Mountcastle suggested that the receptive field concept is not appropriate in 'association' cortex because the complex abstraction of a peripheral event is not describable in such terms (Mountcastle et al., 1975; Mountcastle, 1976) . The task here is to determine the type of behaviour that is related to the optimum discharge of cells. Nor should it be supposed that a single type of function necessarily resides in a single area of the cortex-that would be modern phrenology.
Nevertheless the possibility that there may be a relatively simple correspondence between the activity of cortical neurons and perceived sensation has been argued quite recently (Barlow, 1972) , and this type of approach encourages advancing beyond the kind of question that is asked in the framework of conventional electrophysiology and seeking correlations between neural events and subjective experience. Colour vision provides one example: Zeki proposed that the so-called 'colour-coded' cells of VI do not respond to specific colours at all, but only to the presence of sufficient amounts of their preferred wavelength in the light reaching the eye (Zeki, 1982a, b) . This information is then used by the cells of V4 to assign colours to surfaces, and the pattern of activity in these cells corresponds simply with the subjectively seen colour (Zeki, 19806) . Crick thought that it might be useful to make a distinction between information represented implicitly and explicitly. For instance it could be suggested that colour is implicit in the response of cells in VI, but explicit in V4. That is to say, the responses of cells in VI contain the information required to assign colour to a part of the visual field, but it is only in V4 that cells are found whose responses bear a simple relationship with perceived colour.
Another example of a possible simple correlate of cortical organization does not concern subjective experience but 'hyperacuity', the proven ability to assign a position to a marker in the visual field with very high precision, even when it is moving (Westheimer and McKee, 1975) . This precision corresponds to an angle much smaller than the separation of foveal receptors, and Barlow (1979 Barlow ( , 1981 has suggested that the very large number of granule cells in layer IV of the striate cortex might give a finer 'grain' than that of receptors in the retina. The work of Berkley and Sprague (1979) , already cited, on vernier acuity in cats, certainly supports the idea that VI is necessary for tasks demanding high positional accuracy.
Multiple Areas and Covariation
It might have surprised those thinking about functional localization one hundred years ago that there are, as we now know, a multiplicity of areas devoted to each modality. The question why this should be so is fundamental and was raised repeatedly at the meeting. The best known example is in the visual cortex, where many different visual areas have been demonstrated in the cat Wiesel, 1965a, 1969; Palmer etal., 1978; Tusaefa/., 1978 Tusaefa/., , 1979 Tusa and Palmer, 1980) , in Rhesus (Zeki, 1974 (Zeki, , 1978 , and owl monkey (Baker et al., 1981) . One suggestion is that different visual areas, or groups of areas, are functionally specialized to execute or analyse different visual functions. But why need this be so and why cannot all functions be analysed in the same area? One possible answer (Barlow, 1981) is that information has to be reprojected and brought together, not only according to topographical position in the visual field, but also according to the value of some other variable of the stimulus, such as colour or direction of motion. As MacKay pointed out, there is potentially more information about a stimulus in an ensemble of cells than in any one of them, because of all the possible patterns of covariation among the cells. Thus the reason for having multiple sensory maps may be to make it possible to answer questions such as: What else happened when this happened? Clearly the types of covariation to be detected would differ from one function to another. For cells analysing colour, the question might be: What was the spectral composition of areas neighbouring to my receptive field when the spectral composition for my area was X? For cells detecting motion, the question might be: What else was moving in the same direction as the object in this receptive field? There are many different types of covariation. These may be purely sensory and may be unimodal or multimodal, or they may be purely motor or sensory-motor. Such an analysis of 'covariation' entails, as Barlow suggested, a redistribution of information, either within an area or between areas. It is precisely the execution of this apparently simple task that allows the cortex to detect the association of events in remote parts of the visual field, in different modalities, or the covariation of a sensory event and an item of motor action.
In this context Cowey emphasized several features (Cowey, 1979) . First, cells which interact must be interconnected and this occurs most readily if the cells lie close together. Thus, if cells in the visual cortex related to adjacent parts of the retina are adjacent, the necessary interconnections can be shorter, which would be more economical of space and length of fibres. Also, they might be easier to specify genetically. He also suggested that if lateral inhibition is required to extract certain features from the stimulus (such as contour) this creates problems for interconnections unless cells extracting common features are kept together. This still raises the question of why, in some areas, discontinuities occur. The answer to this may lie in supposing that it is not necessarily geographical contiguity that matters. Functional contiguity may be significant. As an example, if it is desired to map motion in the field of view in the cortex, the precise topographical map that is evident in VI would no longer be what is needed. Instead, it might be arranged that receptive fields with a common property, such as response to a particular direction of motion, reproject to the same small region of cortex so that covariation and association among them can be detected.
MacKay asked early in the meeting: What is VI for? The answer that seemed to receive some support was: It detects local visual features, which are themselves associations of simpler stimuli. Barlow (1981) , following Guzman (1968) , called these 'linking features', and it is because they require information from adjacent parts of the visual field that a topographic map is required. The same question, applied to other visual areas, would receive the answer: They are for detecting the associated occurrences of the same linking feature (colour, direction of motion, disparity, or texture) in different regions of the visual field; they therefore do not require an accurate topographic map, but instead the organized representation of other variables of the stimulus should be sought.
Plasticity of Maps
We tend to think of maps as unalterable passive representations, but Merzenich described experiments which indicated the potentially plastic nature of the map in the somatosensory cortex (Merzenich et ah, 1983) . He studied the effects on the topographic map in monkey somatosensory cortex of manipulations such as median nerve section followed by reinnervation, transposition of nerves in the hand, and amputation of a finger. The results showed an immediate unmasking of a map of parts of a finger (e.g. hairy skin) in territory previously occupied by a representation of other parts. This was often followed by changes in representation of the areas surrounding the deafferented part, such reorganizational changes being more variable in area 1 than in area 3b. However, the 'new' representations were as orderly as the ones they had replaced. Subsequent reinnervation of the affected part Jed to a gradual reinterpolation of a representative of this part into the new topographic map. A possible mechanism underlying these processes will be suggested later, but similar dynamically maintained maps, susceptible to being modified by disturbances in the peripheral receptor sheet, may also occur in the dorsal column nuclei.
Merzenich also described a linear relationship in the distance between units in area 3b and the degree of overlap of their receptive fields (Merzenich et ai, 1983) . The remapping of a topographic region following such experimental manipulations was accompanied by a return to their normal linear relationship when the new map was established. Borders between major topographic subdivisions (e.g. hand and face) were not crossed by these changes. Moreover, the work of Mountcastle and his colleagues on the parietal cortex (Mountcastle et al., 1975) suggests that the representation may be dynamic, changing with time and antecedent activity, and involving the behaviour of the animal as well as attentional mechanisms.
But what allows the map to be modified? The answer may lie, at least partially, in the effects of activity in layer I, which Crick believed to be the single feature that characterizes all areas of the cortex. The input fibres to this layer disregard areal borders and may be, as Mountcastle thought, 'state control' fibres, responsible for controlling the excitability or modifiability of pyramidal cells by diffusely projecting monoaminergic pathways (Crow, 1968; Kety, 1970; Pettigrew, 1978; Moore and Bloom, 1979) . Some may arise in centres such as the locus coeruleus (Gatter and Powell, 1977) or the raphe nuclei, suspected of controlling attentional mechanisms, and may be uniformly distributed throughout the cortex. Others may be gated subcortically, so that different regions of the cortex are influenced differently, since the so-called 'nonspecific' input to thalamus is known to show a relatively crude regional organization.
Sakata, in discussing the parietal cortex as a centre for space perception (Mountcastle et al., 1975) , thought that a topographic representation of the receptor sheet may be insufficient for the perception of self and the environment, for the world is a three-dimensional space whereas the receptor sheet and topographic maps are two-dimensional. Moreover, since we move freely and are interested in objects in motion, the representation in the cortex must be dynamic.
Whether anatomically or functionally related parts of the body surface are mapped contiguously in the cortex, whether the maps are plastic or static, there is little doubt that there are profound differences in the maps between one area and another. Merzenich raised the fundamental question of what is the 'glue' or organizing principle that holds these maps together? Is such a principle common to all areas? This raised the possibility that there is a basic unit in the cortex that performs the same set of operations in each area.
Modular Structure and Function
Mountcastle thought that the striking homogeneity of the monkey cortex up to 110 days of gestation suggested that there was such a unit (Rockel et al., 1980) . It is only after 110 days that the extrinsic connections of the cortex develop and cytoarchitectonic differences begin to appear. Thus he thought that the general operation carried out by the cortex is the same, and differences between areas may reflect the different extrinsic connections. Therefore the fundamental question is: What is this operation being carried out by the cortex?; perhaps the detection of associations, or covariation, may after all prove an adequate answer. The question that obviously follows is: How do the elements in the cortex perform their function? Is there, in other words, a repetitive unit in the cortex, of known anatomical organization, which performs a basically uniform operation, but one which varies from area to area or region to region, according to differences in extrinsic connections?
Szentagothai discussed the concept of a cortical module (Szentagothai, 1978 ) which he thought of as 'a piece of neurotissue', repetitively inserted into the cortex in a similar way to how he imagined printed circuits were put in a computer. There might be as many different types of module as there are different sensory systems. A module should, he believed, have anatomical reality. Some cortical modules do have such reality, such as those 200 to 300 f»m in diameter (Szentagothai, 1978, p. 222) , and also the 'barrels' in lamina IV of somaesthetic cortex of rats (Woolsey and Van der Loos, 1970) . But on the other hand 'orientation columns' in the visual cortex seem to have no anatomical, as opposed to functional, demarcation. Note that the minimum spread of a single thalamic afferent fibre is 300 /xm while the widths of the orientation column are only 30 to 50 ^m. Orientation columns therefore do not seem to correspond to anatomical modules. Mountcastle, who said he believed there are modules in the cortex and that they are about 400 /xm wide, thought that the thalamocortical afferent, the anatomical reality, does not define the orientation column or any other cortical column. It is clear, however, that the ocular dominance stripes in primary visual cortex are defined by the spread of the geniculate afferents in lamina IV, at least in the adult monkey. Whitteridge's results on combined morphological and physiological studies (Gilbert and Wiesel, 1979; Martin et al., 1983) showed no evident correlation between cell morphology and response property, thus reinforcing the view that to seek for an anatomical substrate for all physiological properties may prove to be a difficult exercise.
An example of a module, which might serve as a basis for thinking of modules in general, was discussed by Crick. This is the barrel field in the somatosensory cortex of rodents (Woolsey and Van der Loos, 1970) . In layer IV of this cortex each 'barrel' is marked out by an encircling 'cell-dense net' of diameter 100 to 400 ^m. Each group of cells, forming a barrel, is associated with a single facial vibrissa and interaction is strong among cells of the same barrel, and weak with neighbouring ones. If only one vibrissa is stimulated the deoxyglucose uptake is most obvious in all layers of the corresponding barrel. Here then is a somatosensory cortex organized into (imperfect) modules, but this probably reflects the modular organization of the receptors. It is less obvious why the visual cortex should be organized into modules because the visual field is not modular.
The patterns of cytochrome oxidase activity, shown in monkey striate cortex (Hendriksen et al., 1981; Horton and Hubel, 1981) , suggest that area 17 in primates is based on modules of some sort. But patchiness in itself, whether observed in cytochrome oxidase activity, deoxyglucose activity, or anatomical connectivity, does not necessarily prove that the cortex is modular in organization. Modularity implies that most of the general features of the neuronal arrangement repeat in a fairly regular manner. Thus the test of modularity is that many distinct features repeat in step with each other, an organization hinted at for area 17, but whose details are still not clear there or in any other cortical area in primates.
Thus, one hundred years after the initial debate about cortical localization, arguments about what it is that is localized continue, and the progress made can perhaps be judged partly by the refinements in the questions that we ask. One additional item of progress no-one will doubt: we now have much better techniques for answering the questions. It is interesting to note, however, that the original method, that of studying and trying to explain the deficits of function associated with specific lesions, is still capable of yielding interesting results, and is in a sense the final arbiter; if you cannot show the expected deficits of function after a local lesion, you probably have not got the right answer about what function that local region performs. Furthermore, only limited progress has been made towards understanding the other characteristic of animals suffering cortical damage that, in addition to the paucity of defects, so impressed Goltz in the last century, namely, the restitution of function in the weeks and months following the cortical ablation.
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
We now try to spin together some ideas about the cortex in a more logical order, aiming to present a coherent view of what it actually does. It will be obvious enough that this attempt is speculative and grossly incomplete, but the only way to make progress in understanding the mass of information that is so rapidly accumulating about the brain is first to speculate about its important functions, and then for the wrong speculations to be falsified and eliminated by experimental evidence. We present this section in the form of suggested answers to four questions, followed by the outline of a model to explain how a small portion of cortex may perform its postulated prime function.
What is the Basic Operation of the Cerebral Cortex?
Mountcastle raised this question, which is certainly fundamental even if it should turn out that there is only a very broad similarity in the function of different areas. These different areas of course have different inputs and outputs so it would be easy to make their functions appear different; but in so far as there is any similarity in the pattern of local connections, the operations performed in different regions are surely likely to have something in common, and this is what we must first seek. Discussion and speculation on this point has perhaps been inhibited by the vast apparent difference between the primary projection areas and the traditional association areas of Flechsig (1901) , but as we shall show, this difference may not be as great as is supposed.
First, there is a function performed by the cortex that, important though it is, is not the one we are looking for: this is the redistribution of information from one cortical locality to other parts of the brain, including other places in the cortex. As has already been mentioned, the destination of these connections is associated with the layer of the cortex in which the cell bodies lie. In so far as it is true that cells with one type of selective property are arranged in columns or clusters that pass through all laminae from pia to white matter, the type of information distributed from a given locality is the same for all laminae. This is not strictly true because there are some distinct functional differences between the cells commonly found in different layers, but the main selective properties are the same, so it is probably fair to say that the basic operation is similar for each lamina, modified slightly in accordance with the requirements of the particular destination of cells in particular layers. We must note that cortex performs this redistributive function, but most of us would like to think the cortex does more than simply disseminate information.
The operation that is of overwhelming importance for all higher neural functions is the detection of associations. What is needed in order to build up more elaborate behaviour on a set of fixed reflex responses to fixed classes of stimuli is the ability to recognize that in one set of circumstances one response to a stimulus is appropriate, whereas in another set of circumstances a different response to the same stimulus is required; and for this it is necessary to detect, not just the occurrence of the stimulus, but its occurrence in association with another event or events signifying that the circumstances have changed. The words hitherto used to describe the role of the cortex are all unconscionably vague and undefined-'the seat of intelligence', its 'unifying action', the 'source of the will', and so on-but surely this detection of associations is an operation without which none of these higher functions would be remotely possible. We therefore think this could be the basic operation Mountcastle was seeking, but we first need to refine the concept of 'associations'. MacKay suggested the term 'covariation', and this brings us closer, for it is changes that stimulate our senses, and things that change together are certainly important to us. But the cortex cannot possibly detect all forms of association or covariation, for the following reason. If there are N possible events, there are (N 2 -N)/2 different pairs of events, and 2 N different associations of any size; these numbers are unimaginably large for values of N corresponding to the number of events that might be signalled even in the tiniest brain, or in a very small part of a larger brain. It is therefore rather unhelpful to say that the cortex is interested in associations generally, though the hypothesis has one attractive feature: it might immediately explain why such an enormous expansion of the cortex, the 'neopallial explosion', was an evolutionary necessity once the brain undertook the task of detecting associations. But to make the concept more useful we need to specify the subclass of associations that is particularly important for the control of behaviour.
The kind of association that we think the brain needs especially to detect is that described in detective stories as a 'suspicious coincidence'-an unexpected combination of occurrences that seems to require a causal explanation because it would be unlikely to occur by chance. It is the statistical operation that we want to draw attention to, not the high level conscious process that goes on in the detective's mind. We think that nerve cells use the same inductive logic as the detective, and that statistically significant coincidences are the informational fodder that they grab hold of and devour to build higher perceptual concepts and more complex forms of organized behaviour. The proposal is that cortex does not detect any type of association or covariation, but only those coincidences that would be unlikely to occur by chance and therefore imply another cause.
This may seem very far removed from anything that we actually know the cortex does, so the first point to make is that the elementary types of pattern recognition performed in some primary projection areas fit in with this idea of coincidence detection. The detection of orientation in VI implies the detection of coincident excitation of two points at least, for less than two do not define an orientation. Similarly determining the direction of movement requires detection of the coincidence implied by a sequence of at least two events, and also the detection of the disparities involved in stereopsis requires the detection of a binocular coincidence. Furthermore all these must be 'coincidences' in the sense referred to above: orientated edges, moving stimuli, and paired excitations at small disparities must all occur with frequency higher than expected from first-order probabilities, so to the naive brain they are 'suspicious coincidences' requiring a causal explanation. All of these types of coincidence are detected by cells in primary visual cortex, and some of them can also be paralleled in other primary sensory projection areas.
The equivalent operation in motor cortex is not so easy to see. This cortex is the output channel of complex networks which are believed to be engaged with it in the programming of movements, and which include other cortical areas, basal ganglia, cerebellum and thalamus. In primates its most bulky inputs and outputs are those related to the hand. We should not expect its function to be the detection of significant coincidences in the sensory sphere, but rather the subconscious governing of combinations and sequences of learned movements, especially those of tactile exploration, prehension of moving as well as stationary objects-, and manipulation. Its corticocortical outputs to 'sensory' and 'association' areas would provide those areas with plenty of coincidence-detection fodder from the sphere of movement. Its intrinsic neurons are foci of convergence of corticocortical and thalamocortical inputs bringing information from the moving muscles, joints and skin (Lemon, 1981a, b) , as well as programmed 'commands' for movement. Conrad (1978) appropriately described the motor cortex as 'a primary device for fast adjustment of programmed motor patterns to afferent signals'.
How might this be achieved? Let us imagine the motor cells of the cortex each being activated semiautonomously by influences from remote parts of the nervous system, brought to bear on them by convergent corticocortical and thalamocortical afferents. Certain patterns and sequences will occur more often than expected from the frequencies of the components taken individually: cell a controlling one muscle group will frequently fire with cell b controlling another group, and in accordance with our notion that cortex detects suspicious coincidences, this association will be detected by a cortical neuron in that region just as orientation, corresponding to coincident activation of two or more inputs from the LGN, is detected in area 17. Alternatively a may commonly fire before b, and this sequence will be detected just as direction of motion is detected in area 17.
The coincidence-detecting hypothesis thus begins to explain how the ordered parallel and sequential activities that correspond to a controlled movement might be represented among the cells of motor cortex. It does not explain how such a coordinated movement could be created by activation of cells in motor cortex, but it should be noticed that, in a system with the potentiality for strong negative feedback, the recognition of a goal is a very important step. Suppose, for instance, that the cells detecting unwanted movements were suddenly empowered to exert extremely powerful inhibition on all the motor cells of a region: then the desired movement would be the only one that could occur. The intermingling of sensory information of course greatly increases the richness of information about coincidences that is available in motor areas. It may be worth classifying types of coincidence in an outline scheme that takes account of the known anatomy. Primary coincidences are those detected in the primary projection areas. They must be local in nature (local orientation, local movement, disparity) because a high density of connections between neurons is only possible on a local basis. Secondary coincidences between more remote parts of the sensory field require a secondary projection in which the remote parts are represented closer to each other. The detailed pattern of these projections would facilitate the detection of particular types of coincidence by representing close together in the cortex types of event that are related, not by topographical proximity, but by some other aspect of the stimulus such as colour or direction of movement. The pattern of projection offers a way of simplifying the detection of coincidences that would otherwise seem extremely difficult to pick out, and it is a challenge to think of a means of reprojecting patterns that would, for example, make bilateral symmetry readily detectable, or that would facilitate the classification and recognition of images of faces.
Higher order coincidences would be of several types, including those between second-order coincidences, and those between different modalities. A particularly important category is the coincidence between emotion-producing events, especially rewards and punishments, and initially neutral sensory events. These must be of such overwhelming importance to an animal that we wonder if the diffuse projection systems to the cortex have the role of saying 'The events that have just happened, or are happening now, or are about to happen, are especially important, perhaps even for survival'. If the diffuse projection systems have a special overriding control on the selection of which coincidences are detected we can begin to see how the mapping and connectivity of cortex might be moulded in each individual to the hedonistic requirements of his environment.
The possibility that the cortex is the principal organ for detecting coincidences acquires much greater generality once it is realized that this operation is important in primary projection areas and motor areas, as well as for conditioning and other forms of learned behaviour. Some such function has long been thought to occur in Flechsig's association areas, but if we refine the idea to that of detecting statistically significant coincidences we see that it could be the basic operation of all parts of cortex.
What is the Cortical Language?
Coincidence detecting may be the basic operation, but how are the input events signalled, and how is the occurrence of a coincidence expressed? MacKay pointed out that a given nerve cell in the cortex receives input from a very large number of other cells, many of them close neighbours, with a few lying at considerable distances. It would be very hard to believe that a functionally sensible outcome could arise from these connections unless the communications transmitted down them followed a set of conventions, and these conventions might be termed the cortical language. It could perhaps be maintained that every single connection is a law in its own right, and has its own special meaning, so that there are no general rules in this language and nothing to be gained by terming it such. But the irregular branching pattern of an afferent input to the cortex does rather suggest that an impulse arriving down that fibre broadcasts some piece of news into a cortical region; the region might be quite small, but would nonetheless contain many thousands of cells. MacKay's idea was that some general principles for employing impulses would be necessary if such news was to be intelligible, and we think that one possible principle can be defined; furthermore we shall show how its use might facilitate the role of cortex as coincidence-detector.
Perhaps the people round a conference table provide an analogy to the cells in a small cortical region, and there are certainly necessary conventions to allow effective mutual communication at the conference table. Every utterance is broadcast to the whole table, and the first rule is for everyone to keep generally silent; without that convention communications could not even be heard. A second is that, when silence is broken, the duration and strength of an utterance should be roughly proportional to its importance. We can hardly expect nerve cells to talk to each other in a specific language like English, but even general conventions of the above sort, though too rudimentary to call a language, might prevent cortical cells suffering the equivalent of being deafened or being bored, and it must be very important to establish whether such conventions exist.
There is little doubt that nerve impulses are the elements of communication between cortical nerve cells, at least over distances greater than a millimetre or two; the conference table rules proposed above suggest that impulses should be used sparingly, and that when they are used each one should carry its due weight. According to Uttley (1979) this due weight should be measured in terms of Shannon-type information, which strictly interpreted would mean that each impulse should signal the same change in the log of the a priori probability of some input event. More loosely it might be said that good housekeeping in the nervous system demands that the principle of 'economy of impulses' (Barlow, 1969a) should be practised. The narrow dynamic range of nerve fibres, considered as communication channels, makes this especially important; if impulses were squandered needlessly it is difficult to see how any messages could be transmitted at a reasonable signal/noise ratio. There is in fact some evidence that these principles are heeded at levels below the cortex, and that messages in optic nerve and tract are already coded so that events with a very low prior probability cause many impulses whereas those with relatively high prior probability cause few (Barlow, 19696, 1980) . But let us see how attention to these principles may be more than good housekeeping and may facilitate coincidence detection. Now a coincidence is suspicious in the detective story sense if P > > P A x P B , where P A and P B are the prior probabilities of events A and B considered separately, and P AB is that of the joint occurrence of both of them. Any of these quantities might be computed in a region where signals for A and B are arriving, provided that the combined event is also detected whenever it occurs. But this presents a serious problem, for it seems that it would be necessary to detect the occurrence of all coincidences in order to calculate their probabilities and find out which of them are suspicious. As we have seen there is a vast number of possible coincidences, many of which are likely to be of no interest whatever, and it seems implausible that the cortex would dissipate its hardware by devoting it to the detection and counting of all of them.
There is one neat way of reducing this problem. If P A and P B , etc., are all small, then any coincidental occurrence of two (or more) events that take place with a frequency anywhere near that of the events themselves is likely to be a significant coincidence. This is simply because the product P A x P B (or of more of them) is necessarily much less than each probability alone, so if P AB approaches P A or P B it certainly exceeds their product by a big margin. Hence, provided that P A and P B are small, the problem for the cortex is simplified to that of detecting any coincidence that occurs reasonably often; according to the hypothesis such patterns are ones that the cortex should detect and signal, so it would be expected that some cells become selectively sensitive to them and respond to no other input patterns.
There is an analogy here with the problem of determining disparity in the pair of images provided by the two eyes. If we take a point in one image and try to search for the point corresponding to it in the other image, our first inclination might be to look at the points with the same luminance value in the other image. But, except for extreme luminance values, there are a vast number of points at any given luminance level, and this is therefore a poor way to attempt to identify the parts of the two images that correspond to the same object in the visual fields of the two eyes. It is better to pick a pattern feature in one image that has a low prior probability, and then search for the occurrence of the same pattern feature in the other image, and VI appears to use this principle, orientated lines and edges providing the requisite features of low prior probability (Barlow et al., 1967) . It is much easier to detect important coincidences when the prior probabilities of the separate events are low, but while it is important to pick a feature that has a low prior probability, it would be useless to pick features whose prior probabilities are too low, for then they would hardly ever be used. Suspicious coincidences that actually occur are the only kind that are any use to detectives, or the cortex.
How might the cortex be set up so that it detects the suspicious coincidences that actually occur? We have some evidence on this from the well-known effects of restriction of visual experience in the critical period. To take the best known example Wiesel, 1963,19656,1970; Hubel 1963a, b, 1965a, b) , a normal kitten has many cells in VI that respond best to joint stimulation by the same stimulus through both eyes; they can thus be called detectors of coincident stimulation through both eyes. But if the kitten is prevented from experiencing these coincidences by alternating occlusion of the eyes or by surgically-induced strabismus, then the number of such cells is drastically reduced. The coincidence detectors that are present correspond to coincidences, covariations, or associations that actually occur.
Notice that coincidences cease, in a sense, to be suspicious once it is firmly established that they do occur with a frequency greater than that expected from the prior probabilities of the constituent events; the suspicion that there is an unknown cause of the association is replaced by recognition of some such connection, but the coincidence does not thereby become irrelevant; as in the case of orientated edges, movement, or disparity, the occurrence of the specific coincidence can be used as a building block, an event capable of taking part in higher level coincidences. In fact it will be an event of higher 'relative entropy' than the constituent events, and therefore eminently suitable, according to one theory, as an event for representation of our perceptions (Barlow, 1984) .
To summarize this answer it has been suggested that probability and Shannontype information play a large part in the cortical language. In the interests of good housekeeping the tokens of information exchange-nerve impulses-should be used with roughly constant and preferably high informational value. The high informational value of impulses means that the events they signal have low prior probability and this facilitates the detection of coincidences, for the cortex need only devote hardware to the detection of patterns of coincident events that occur with reasonable frequency. It is plausible to suppose that the critical period in cortical development is the period within which particular cells develop responsiveness to particular coincidences.
Why have Multiple Sensory Areas?
The suggested answer to this should now be clear: it is to facilitate the detection of specific classes of coincidence. Most connections to a particular cortical cell are from other cortical cells lying close at hand, or from input fibres which terminate in a fairly restricted region around the cell. The type of covariation, association, or coincidence that a cell can detect is therefore very strongly dependent upon where it lies and the source of the information being projected to that position in the cortex. This is where the redistributive function of the cortex can be seen to gain its importance, for this controls both the information that reaches each small region, and the destinations to which it is in turn distributed. The role of a telephone exchange is trivial if it routes messages to any possible destination according to the dial tones it receives, but it is quite a different matter if it is prewired and thereby controls which subpopulation of receivers gets all messages of a particular type.
How should such redistribution be organized? Since we have decided that the role of cortex is to detect coincidences, that is, associations of events that are a priori improbable but occur nonetheless, what we require from the redistribution is the bringing together of messages about events among which coincidences are likely to occur. For example, rigid objects often occupy quite a large portion of the field of view, but being rigid they move as a whole; therefore one needs to bring together movement information over substantial parts of the visual field in order that, when such an object translates, the coincident firing of local movement detectors lying at fairly distant points in the field of view shall detect the movement. The problem is of course not as simple as this because the object might, for instance, be partially concealed, or it might rotate instead of translate, but the principle does seem clear: the pattern of reprojection should be such as will bring together in small local cortical regions the information required to detect likely coincidences.
From the Gestalt psychologists we know something about what global or general characteristics of visual images are in fact brought together in this way, for they are the characteristics that enable an image to be segregated into its major components, particularly the separation of figure from ground. Proximity in the visual field is of course one such characteristic, as is proximity in the depth plane or similarity of disparity. Likewise with colour, texture and the direction and velocity of movement. Interestingly enough, the importance of defining local cues which would help to identify different parts of the same object was one of the first lessons learned from those using computers to interpret visual images, and Guzman (1968) gave these characteristics the term 'linking feature'. The role of VI can thus be succinctly described as that of detecting linking features by local analysis of the visual image, and redistributing this information to areas specializing in each of the linking features in order for higher order coincidences to be detected there.
There is clearly much to be done to work out the implications of this idea, if correct. What is the role of area 18, or V2? Why do the other areas still have a considerable amount of topographical mapping? Can evidence for any other principles of organization, such as mapping according to nontopographical variables, be found in these other areas? But at least the hypothesis has some preliminary appeal.
Can Synoptic Rewarding Factors Explain Cortical Plasticity?
Merzenich said that, as a result of his experiments showing both plasticity and constancy in the pattern of cortical mapping, he kept on asking himself the question 'What is the cortical glue? How is continuity ensured in the map so that neighbouring regions on the skin project to neighbouring regions in the cortex?' It is perhaps worth proposing a fairly specific mechanism that would fit many of the facts.
Let us first recall the unexpected nature of the early results obtained by Hubel (1963a, b, 1965a, b) when they investigated the visual cortex and lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) of visually deprived kittens. In the cells of the cortex they found clear evidence that sensory deprivation modified the pattern of connections to cortical neurons, especially if deprivation was monocular. The monocular experiment not only provided an in-built control, so that they could compare the effects of stimulating the two eyes in the same preparation and on cells recorded within a few minutes of each other, but they also showed that the undeprived eye competes for control of cortical neurons, and that the effects of deprivation are less in binocularly deprived animals in whom there is no such competition. In contrast, when they recorded from cells in the LGN, they could find little effect of either monocular or binocular deprivation on the functional properties of the cells, though they thought that it did make the responses slightly more sluggish.
When they came to look at the anatomy of cortex and LGN the results were the exact opposite. They could find no abnormalities in the cortex, but the cells of laminae in the LGN fed by a deprived eye were abnormal and reduced in size. What is unexpected here is the relation between anatomical and physiological changes: it is natural to expect that an anatomical change signifies a more serious functional defect, yet it was the LGN cells, earlier in the chain from eye to cortex, that were affected anatomically. Anatomical changes have subsequently been found in the cortex, where the ocular-dominance stripes shrink and swell in accordance with deprivation and experience within the critical period, but the clue to interpretation may still lie in the somewhat paradoxical earlier result that anatomical changes occur in the cells of the LGN, for the functional changes in the cortex may be secondary to the factor influencing the LGN cell bodies.
Suppose that the LGN cells that succeed in activating cortical neurons are rewarded and grow, whereas their companions, connected to the deprived eye, shrink because they fail to activate the cortical cells and are unrewarded. This could be explained if an unknown substance, a synoptic rewarding factor, is released by cortical neurons when they are activated, picked up by the recently active terminals of the nerve fibres that have caused the activity, and transported back to the cell body where it triggers nuclear changes causing growth of that cell together with the branches and terminals that picked up the synaptic rewarding factor. A feedback mechanism of this sort could be very powerful and effective in controlling growth and functional development, but how wild a speculation is it?
There is one key question for which positive evidence is available. The anatomical changes in the LGN and the functional changes in the cortex might be quite independent, each resulting simply from inactivity of the cells concerned. This would be in accord with the general view that activity is required to preserve the health of cells, and the more specific view of ophthalmologists that exercise of the pathway from a 'lazy' eye can prevent or reverse amblyopic changes. But Movshon and Van Sluyters (1981) argue against this and review much evidence showing that the cellular changes in the LGN and the functional changes in cortical neurons go hand in hand. Furthermore, Rauschecker and Singer (1981) have studied the effects of various combinations of partial and complete deprivation in one or both eyes by rearing kittens with goggles that either gave a clear view, or contained occluders, or held strongly astigmatic lenses effectively depriving an eye of vision of horizontal or vertical contours. They concluded from their results, which are the culmination of much previous work on the effects of various forms of visual deprivation (see Wiesel and Hubel, 1963a, b; Hirsch and Spinelli, 1970; Blakemore and Cooper, 1970 ; see also review by Movshon and Van Sluyters, 1981) , that all can be explained in terms of Hebb-type synapses. This type of synapse was originally proposed (Hebb, 1949) as a mechanism of learning, and it possesses the hypothetical property that synaptic effectiveness increases if postsynaptic activity frequently follows presynaptic activity, and decreases if there is no such associated activity. The postulated synaptic rewarding factor would provide a mechanism for such a synapse.
Another important question is whether it is plausible to postulate the postsynaptic release of a substance and its pick-up by presynaptic terminals: can a synapse 'talk back' to its activating nerve fibre? The idea has a respectable history (Hamburger and Levi-Montalcini, 1949; Prestige, 1970) , but the best model would be Nerve Growth Factor, for it has been suggested that this has a physiological role very much like that postulated for a synaptic rewarding factor, but acting at the synapses of peripheral fibres on their target organs (Hendry and Iversen, 1973) . It is certainly the case that such substances can be picked up by nerve terminals and transported to their cell bodies, where they can have the well-known effect of activating growth (Hendry et al., 1974; Hendry and Hill, 1980) . It is also known that synaptic terminals of the LGN cortical afferents can pick up substances (such as horseradish peroxidase) and transport them back to the cell body.
To return to Merzenich's maps, the suggested mechanism would work as follows. Cortical afferents corresponding to regions of the body surface that were denervated or prevented from normal sensory stimulation would not excite neurons and would therefore cease to receive their normal ration of synaptic rewarding factor. The overlapping terminals from neighbouring regions that did not normally activate a given cortical cell would start doing so as the cell became hypersensitive in the absence of normal activation, and these terminals would, so to speak, steal the synaptic rewarding factor normally picked up by the now inactive terminals. The unrewarded cells would shrink, retracting their terminals, while the newly rewarded cells of the neighbouring regions would grow, expanding their terminal territories and ousting the terminals of the inactive region. Topological equivalence of the newly formed map with the old one would be likely to result from the initial overlap of innervated areas combined with graded competition for synaptic space on the cortical neurons. Whether a scenario of this sort is correct can only be determined by seeking evidence for the existence of synaptic rewarding factors, and for their release, pick-up, transport and growth-promoting cellular effects.
A Possible Model for the Coincidence-detecting Mechanism of Cortex
Start by considering a small area of cortex, perhaps 1 to 2 mm 2 . The input to this area will be from cells in other parts of cortex together with thalamocortical afferents which will be prominent in the major sensory projection areas. Judging from the anatomy, each of these inputs must terminate on a very large number of cells, and each of these cells must receive input from a quite large proportion of the afferent fibres to each small region. In a grossly overlapping system like this any single afferent will tend to activate a very large number of cells, but with strengths varying from cell to cell. The same will be true of any specific pattern of activity of many input fibres, the level of excitation being of course generally higher when many inputs are active. Without any additional mechanisms the result would simply be to blur and spread out any patterns in the input, and it is hard to see that anything would be achieved. There would be general confusion and a degradation of the separability of inputs, though it is true that the associated activity of many inputs would in general cause more output activity, simply because of the greater excitation caused by many active inputs. Now add to this arrangement a powerful mechanism of mutual inhibition acting between the cortical neurons; this might be direct, or it might be mediated by a special set of inhibitory internuncial neurons. If the mutual inhibition was so strong that a single active cell prevented all others in the neighbourhood firing, the maximum number of possible states of activity in the output would be equal to or less than the number of output neurons: any single active cell would prevent all others firing. In this way a system might be achieved in which the input states were classified into a limited number of mutually exclusive output states. Notice one particular feature of such an arrangement: if the number of output cells was greater than the number of input cells, some of the outputs would necessarily correspond to combinations of activity of inputs, so that it could be said that these output cells detected coincident activity of some subset of inputs. It is far from clear, however, that the coincidences detected would be of any interest, or that the classification achieved would be desirable in any way. The specific form of the classification would depend on the initial strengths of the input array on the output cells, which might be controlled by genetic factors, or perhaps largely by chance.
Next add a synaptic rewarding factor; as described above, this is (hypothetically) released by an output cell when activated, picked up by the synaptic terminals that caused excitation, and transported back to the cell body where it promotes growth of that cell and those of its terminals that are successfully activating cortical neurons. We cannot visualize with any certainty how such a system will develop, but can see that it provides a means of adjusting the pattern of input connectivity. Input fibres that are often active will expand their territory at the expense of less active ones, for they will more often activate output cells and thus pick up more than their share of synaptic rewarding factor. But if the number of output cells is large compared with the number of inputs, some of them will necessarily only be activated by a combination of inputs, and input cells that frequently take part in such combinations will also be rewarded. Hence, though some outputs might come to be dominated by single inputs, we would expect others to respond selectively to frequently occurring combinations, that is, to 'suspicious coincidences'.
Simulation of such a scheme would be needed to find whether it could achieve stable and interesting forms of recoding. One particularly interesting question to resolve is the relative importance of adjustments of inputs at the cellular level and at a synaptic level. It is hypothesized that the synaptic rewarding factor works at both levels, but it would be interesting to know how far the growth of whole cells on Hebbian principles might substitute for the modification of individual synapses according to Hebb's original suggestion. What is reasonable to claim is that modifiability on the scale of this model is compatible with what we know both about the genetically determined structure of the cortex, and the effects of experience. Furthermore, it might achieve the suggested basic operation of cortex, namely, the detection of significant coincidences.
CONCLUSIONS
The facts presented in London one hundred years ago perhaps gave the first indication that it would be possible to find out experimentally how the cerebral cortex works, for it was the experimental facts that showed how damage to different parts of, the cortex caused noticeably different effects. To conclude, it may be interesting to conduct a sort of'thought experiment' in which a man of considerable longevity with a passionate interest in the cerebral cortex asks questions of neurobiologists at intervals of, say, one hundred or fifty years. One hundred years ago, he might have asked: .'What does the cortex do?' and the response would have been: 'We are studying whole regions of the cortex to determine whether different parts have the same or different functions.' Asking the same question today, the response would be: 'We are studying minute areas of the cortex, small groups of cells, to discover whether there is a basic operation, a function, common to all areas of the brain.' Fifty years ago, he might have said: 'You have shown me that there are primary receiving areas and association areas, but can you tell me how the areas of the brain interact to display the integration evident in thought and behaviour?' The answer would have been 'No!' Asking the same question today, the response would be the same, in spite of the fact that we know that much of the so-called association cortex is made up of a multiplicity of sensory areas. He might have asked, one hundred years ago: 'How does the cortex see forms?' He would have been told: 'We think that there is a part of the cortex that is specialized for vision and it is through the activity of cells in that area that the brain sees forms, but we don't quite know how.' Today we might say: 'We know that there is a visual cortex and that cells in it respond to specific visual stimuli such as orientated or diffuse lights, or particular colours, but we still do not know how the brain sees forms.' Our interlocutor, getting more interested, might then ask: 'Is there a special morphology attributable to cells with particular functions? Henschen told me eighty years ago that colour cells are distinguishable by their anatomy.' We would reply: 'We have used the most sophisticated techniques of intracellular recordings and injections but cannot correlate function and structure at the level of the single cell. ' Our imaginary guest, disappointed, might wonder why it is, then, that neurobiologists today seem so confident that they will understand, perhaps within years, some of the elusive secrets of the cortex. We would tell him to return, not in fifty years, but in five because our range of facts is now so great and hence we are able to speculate, as in the last section, in ways which we could not have done even twenty years ago. This, in turn, allows us to explore new approaches, discount old ideas and pursue new ones, always with the knowledge that the one certain thing about the future of cortical studies is that there will be surprises which will alter radically our way of thinking about the brain.
